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Ownership, control, compensation and restructuring of Lithuanian 
enterprises  - preliminary results from a manager survey 
Niels Mygind, CEES/CBS, June 2002 
 
1. Background for the survey and research questions 
The manager survey is part of an ongoing research project on governance and enterprise 
restructuring. We have made studies on ownership and economic performance for a large 
sample of companies in the Baltic States based on ownership surveys and data from 
balance sheets and income statements as reported to the statistical departments. 
However, we needed deeper knowledge about the extent to which ownership actually 
meant dominant control by the group of majority owners and to what extent the 
managers dominated both strategic and operational decisions in the enterprise. We also 
needed deeper information on the questions connected to compensation systems for 
managers and other employees. Finally, we wanted more information about different 
indicators of restructuring.  
 
The main research questions concern the variation on different types of ownership, 
which we have divided in majority ownership by: state, foreign, domestic external, 
managers, other employees or no majority. The survey also makes the distinction 
whether the company is still state owned, privatized or has started as a new entity.  
 
The research questions concern the relation between ownership structure and:  
1: the relation between ownership and control;  
2: compensation systems for managers and other employees; and  
3: different forms of restructuring. 
 
The focus of the survey and this paper is the governance problems between owners and 
managers included in (1). The compensation of managers (2) can be seen as one of the 
instruments, the owners can use for controlling the managers. In the control dimension 
we also look at other groups, especially other employees, and their different channels of 
influence, and in relation to the compensation dimension we also include a question on 
compensation systems for employees. The types of ownership and governance structures 
are basic explanatory outcomes for restructuring of the enterprises and economic 
performance included in (3). However, the relation between performance and 
ownership/governance structure will not be deeply analyzed in this paper. Such an 
analysis needs a more sophisticated multivariate approach. This has been, and will be 
done, in more focused papers, see e.g. Jones and Mygind, 2001 and 2002. However, the 
specification of governance structures and compensation systems can be used as inputs 
for further and more sophisticated studies. 
 
Since Berle and Means (1932) the problem of how owners control managers has been a 
core question of corporate governance. Since Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983), the most used theoretical tool has been the principal agent approach. The 
core problem of governance has been defined as how the owner, the principal, can 
control the manager, the agent. Different control mechanisms are possible. But some of 
them are of little relevance in the early stages of transition because the necessary 
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institutions are missing or insufficiently developed. This is the case for control of the 
managers through a well functioning stock market. Such control is only possible for a 
handful of large enterprises in the Baltic countries (Mygind 2000). The market for 
managers is another control mechanism with high importance in Western corporate 
governance systems, but such a market is not developed in the transitional economies 
because of high uncertainty and volatility making it nearly impossible to assess the 
managers’ performance in relation to the success of the company. Legislative restrictions 
on the managers’ scope of action have also limited importance. The main remaining 
governance instruments for the owners are: 
- direct control by owners represented in the board 
- shifting managers if necessary 
- strong concentrated ownership 
- compensation systems for managers 
- product market competition limiting the scope of actions and making it easier to   
  evaluate manager performance in relation to other enterprises. 
- banks monitoring debt 
 
The manager survey gives the material for answering a broad specter of research 
questions related to these governance instruments. I will here give a short outline of the 
main questions, which also structure the following presentation of preliminary results 
from the manager survey.  
 
Is there correspondence between type of ownership and board representation? 
How is the influence on different groups on different areas of decisions? 
What are the main channels for employee influence? 
 
In the latest years there has in the West been a strong tendency for advocating more 
independent boards in relation to the top-managers. Such a development is supported 
both by large institutional investors and researchers (Johnson et al 1996).  
If the board is under the control of management it cannot function as an instrument for 
the owners to control management. This does not necessarily mean that the board should 
have no insiders. A few inside directors in the board may help to overcome some of the 
information problems for the outsiders and provide an important internal monitoring 
function (Fama and Jensen 1983). We would expect the owners to have the majority of 
the seats in the board, but some other groups such as managers and other employees as 
well as e.g. representatives from banks could be occupying a minority of the seats.  
 
When the possibilities for external monitoring are limited, monitoring by insiders can be 
expected to gain in importance. Together with specific privatization methods favoring 
insiders, this is the main reason why insider ownership including broad employee 
ownership is more widespread in Eastern Europe than in other parts of the world 
(Vaughan Whitehead and Uvalic 1997, Mygind 2001,). Direct ownership by managers 
directly eliminates the owner-manager governance problem, but also employee 
ownership especially by well-informed groups of employees can improve monitoring of 
the managers. In this respect it is important whether the employees actually control the 
managers or whether paternalistic traditions of management dominance over the 
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employees continue after the control rights formally has been transferred to broader 
groups of employees (Mygind 2002). Buck et al (1998) document such tendencies in 
Russia, and Kalmi (2002) find it widespread in Estonian employee owned enterprises. In 
manager owned enterprises and employee owned, but management controlled, 
enterprises, you will expect entrenchment by incumbent managers (Filatochev, Wright 
and Bleaney 1999). 
 
Is the tenure of managers varying with different owner-groups? 
 
An ultimate control device for the owners is through the board or through the general 
assembly to fire the imcumbant manager and select a new person for the position. A long 
tenure of the manager can therefore be an indication for entrenchment of the manager, 
and a weak position of the board. In relation to different types of ownership we expect 
the managers to have the strongest position in management owned enterprises and in 
enterprises with relatively weak owners such as state ownership, some employee owned 
enterprises and domestic externally owned enterprises with diversified ownership. 
 
 How is the relation between concentration of ownership on specific groups of owners 
and on the largest single owner in relation to type of majority ownership? 
 
The manager can be expected to have the strongest position when ownership is 
diversified, and it will not pay off for the relatively small shareholders to invest in 
information and monitoring of management. In a situation where the capital markets and 
other control institutions are not functioning high concentration of ownership can be 
expected (Mygind, 2001). Such concentration can both be measured as the percentage 
owned by a specific group of shareholders with a specific stakeholder interest. This is 
enough when we consider foreign ownership, because the typical foreign investor is a 
foreign company with a strategic investment in the transitional enterprise. However, 
especially for domestic externally owned enterprises this measure must be supplemented 
with information about the proportion of shares belonging to the largest owner. In this 
way we can distinguish between diversified external ownership and the situation with a 
core investor.  
 
Another important governance problem is the minority problem, when an owner exploits 
a dominating position to appropriate rights from minority owners. This is done, by 
favoring the dominating owners’ stakeholder interest at the expense of shareholder value 
(Mygind, 2001). In the West important remedies are strict legislation and high 
transparency. However, these instruments are not developed in transition economies. 
Again, remaining solution is to avoid minority ownership simply by concentration of 
ownership. Therefore, we expect that ownership is concentrated on specific types of 
stakeholders and that minority ownership by other stakeholders is quite rare. 
  
 Is the competitive pressure varying with ownership type? 
Competition from other companies can also be an important factor disciplining the 
managers. Tough competition means that the managers’ scope of actions is limited, and 
comparison of the performance with competitors gives the owners a tool for 
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benchmarking the performance of the managers. The degree of competition is at the 
same time an important control variable in studies of performance. 
 
 
2. How do the compensation systems for managers vary with the different types of 
ownership structures?   
 
As noted before, there is a close relation between owners’ governance of managers and 
management compensation. Result dependent remuneration of managers can be used to 
align the interests of managers and owners. It can be expected that privatized companies 
are more market dependent and more result oriented also in the incentive schemes for 
managers. 
 
The ultimate incentive scheme is of course when the managers own the company and 
have all the rights of financial returns. In this case it can be expected that the managers 
give higher priority to profit and accumulation of capital in the company while the 
manager salary may be cut. However, this argument holds only for 100% ownership, 
because if there are considerable minority owners, managers can instead maximize 
individual return by paying out high salaries. In employee owned enterprises equality 
considerations may imply lower salary levels for managers.  
 
3. Do the degree and type of restructuring vary between the different types of 
ownership? 
 
The management survey alone cannot cover a comprehensive analysis of performance 
and restructuring. The idea is first to get deeper information on variables concerning 
control and compensation, which then can be used in deeper performance studies based 
on financial data with measures such as productivity or profitability as dependent 
variables. However, we have in the manager survey collected some variables, which are 
either not included or not reliable in existing financial data (this is the case for variables 
showing the change of inputs and outputs from Eastern to Western markets, and 
measures on the rate of utilization of the labor force and plant and equipment. We have 
also collected more qualitative information asking the companies directly about changes 
in key areas such as products, production process, suppliers, markets and organizational 
structure. 
 
In the following section 2 we give some detail about the Lithuanian manager survey. 
Section 3 gives an overview over the data set and the distribution on origin, majority 
ownership, size and branch. The origin and ownership structure are used in many of the 
following tables showing the relation between different variables and ownership. In 
section 4 we look at the relation between ownership and control following the research 
questions raised in section 1. In section 5 we look at the different compensation systems 
used in the different companies. Section 6 summarizes the results on the questions 
concerning different types of restructuring. Finally, section 7 is the conclusion with 
preliminary answers on the research questions. Note, however, that much of the 
information included in the survey will be more deeply analyzed in later econometric 
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studies. This working-paper is written to give an overview over preliminary results, to 
define new hypotheses and to make a comparison with similar surveys for Estonia and 
Latvia. 
 
2. The Lithuanian Manager Survey 
The survey was done in cooperation with the Lithuanian Department of Statistics. The 
instrument was designed by Niels Mygind, and the first pilots were done in Estonia in 
1996/97. The main survey was done in Estonia in 1997/98 covering 220 enterprises. In 
Latvia a similar survey was done in the spring of 1997 comprising 167 enterprises. 
Based on the experience with the Estonian and Latvian surveys the Lithuanian survey 
included some changes in the instrument. A few questions were reformulated and some 
new questions added. While the Estonian and Latvian surveys included a sequence of 
years 1993-1997 and 1993-1996, in Lithuania we asked about the years 1993, 1996 and 
1999. We also asked about the ownership structure at the time or privatization. By 
focusing only on specific years we simplified the survey scheme in an attempt to limit 
the tendency for the respondents just to note that there were the same results for all years.  
 
The questionnaire was performed in the spring of 2000 and the result was 405 responses. 
The survey scheme was made both in an English and a Lithuanian version with cross 
checking for the quality of the translations. The English version is enclosed in the 
appendix. The Lithuanian questionnaire has 19 main questions, divided in 90 sub-
questions, and most of these are divided on three years 1993, 1996 and 1999, plus for 
ownership questions also the time of privatization. In total there are 270 entries for the 
enterprises answering all questions for all years.  
 
The sample of enterprises was based on the GEREE Lithuanian database with a large 
total set of financial data for 1997 covering 7546 enterprises. From these data set we 
excluded: Public sector companies water supply, health, community and social services; 
100% state and municipally owned enterprises in 1997; companies with less than 20 
employees; a few outliers and companies lacking information for key financial variables. 
From the remaining enterprises all large enterprises with more than 100 employees and 
one third of the smaller enterprises were included. After this procedure 1372 enterprises 
were left. All these enterprises were contacted if possible. However, 32 were closed 
down/on the edge of bankruptcy and many other enterprises refused to answer. In total 
we had 405 responses. That is a response rate of 30%. The questionnaires were sent to 
the top-managers, but most interviews were done on location by interviewers from the 
Statistical Department.
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3. Privatization, Ownership structure, Size and Branch. 
Table Q.19  Ownership on origin (privatization/new) 
 
state 
 
\ownership 1993 
foreign domes-
tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee 
no ma-
jority 
total 
 privatized 1 43 25 41 54 164
 new 14 5 22 4 2 47
154 total including state 15 48 47 45 56 365
 \ownership 1996  
 privatized 3 80 52 36 74       245
 new 24 17 38 6 2 87
73 total including state 27 97 90 42 76 405
 \ownership 1999  
 privatized 8 85 57 29 75 254
 new 26 13 39 4 5 87
64 total including state 34 98 96 33 80 405
 
40 of the new enterprises were established between 1993 and 1996. Therefore, the total 
number increases from 365 to 405 between these two years. There are relatively few new 
enterprises in the sample. This is related to the exclusion of small enterprises. There are 
relatively few foreign enterprises in the sample. This is related to the fact that foreigners 
had a weak position in the first years of privatization in Lithuania. In 1993 there is only 
one foreign owned privatized company. This number increases in the later years so there 
are 8 enterprises of this type by 1999, while there are 26 newly established foreign 
enterprises by 1999. Among the management owned enterprises there are also quite 
many new enterprises, but for all the other ownership types we have much more 
privatized than new. A relatively large group of enterprises is categorized as no majority. 
 
Table Q.20.1  Ownership/origin on industry   1999       
    \majority ownership 
industry 
state  fo-
reign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no 
major.
total priva-
tized 
new 
agriculture & fishing 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 0
mining, wood, chemicals 8 12 23 17 4 20 84 54 23
manufacturing  7 8 26 12 4 13 70 54 9
construction  3 2 7 2 0 6 20 11 5
whole trade & retail   6 1 22 33 9 24 95 80 7
hotels & restaurants 3 8 16 25 15 8 75 41 32
transport,communication 18 3 2 5 1 1 30 5 8
other 19 0 1 2 0 7 29 7 3
total 64 34 98 96 33 80 405 254 87
 
In relation to the distribution of all enterprises larger than 20 employees there are quite 
few in agriculture and fishing, while trade and especially hotels and restaurants are 
slightly over-represented in the sample. The remaining state owned enterprises are in the 
groups of transport, communication and other. Foreign owned enterprises are quite few 
in trade. Management owned enterprises are strongest in hotel and restaurants and trade. 
This is also the case for ownership by other employees for which nearly half of the cases 
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are found in hotels and restaurants. 
 
Table Q.22 Number of Employed Persons Ultimo 
                 \ownership 
average per enterprise 
state  fo-
reign  
domes
-tic  
mana-
ger  
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
employees 1993 N=317 419 222 282     183     233 445 334 375 62
employees 1996 N=402 341 240 279 188 174 276 252 277 122
employees 1999 N=405 231 287 188 141 136 324 213 220 154
of which managers 3 4 4 3 3 5 4 4 3
              other employees 228 283 184 138 133 319 209 216 151
total 1999 1-19 2 2 4 7 1 1 17 7 8
 20-49 6 1 6 13 5 6 37 16 16
 50-99 10 5 24 26 10 13 88 60 19
 100-199 25 11 36 30 10 30 142 95 23
 200- 21 15 28 20 7 30 121 76 21
                                    N 64 34 98 96 33 80 405 254 87
 
The average size is quite large because enterprises with less than 20 employees in 1997 
were excluded from the sample. Some of them have cut employment since 1997 and 
therefore a few enterprises have less than 20 employees in 1999. The average number of 
employees has fallen over the years as a result of reactive restructuring and spin offs. 
The number of managers is relatively small, which indicates a quite narrow perception of 
the term “manager”. The average size of insider owned enterprises is somewhat lower 
than the remaining groups. This is similar to the results from the management surveys in 
Estonia and Latvia. 
 
Privatized are larger than new enterprises, but it is worth noting that some privatized 
enterprises are quite small, less than 50, and quite many of the new enterprises are quite 
large, with 50 or more employees. These results are also found in the Estonian and 
Latvian surveys and indicate a considerable lack of validity in studies like the World 
Bank (2002), that make the distinction between new and privatized only based on the 
number of employees. 
 
The concentration of ownership is by definition high in majority state owned enterprises. 
A foreign owned enterprise is typically owned by a single foreign core owner, therefore 
the concentration is also high in this type of companies. (If there is more than one 
foreign owner the percentage can be lower than 50%). This is also the case for 
management owned enterprises where the top-manager typically is the core-owner, 
although other managers and other employees also often are co-owners. In the other end 
of the scale we find employee owned companies where the ownership is diversified on 
several employees. It must be noted, that the concentration is increasing over time, 
indicating that a smaller group of employees/managers concentrate the ownership. By 
definition concentration is low in no-majority enterprises. Domestic externally owned 
private enterprises also have relatively low concentration. This group can be divided in 
the cases with quite concentrated ownership where the largest owner own more than 50% 
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(38% of cases) and diversified ownership with the largest owner owning less than 50%  
(62% of  cases). 
 
Table Q.21  Percentage Owned by the Largest Owner – on ownership  
   \majority ownership 
 
state  foreign domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
New 
1993 0 - 24% 
25 - 49% 
50 - 74% 
75-100% 
average % 
                 N 
0 
0 
17 
74 
91 
91 
1
3
4
7
67 
15
17
16
12
3
34
48
5
14
13
13
55 
45
35
10
0
0
16 
45
28
27
0
0
26 
55
97 
70 
44 
88 
48 
299 
67 
35 
8 
62 
34 
192 
7
4
7
32
55 
50 
1996 0 - 24% 
25 - 49% 
50 - 74% 
75-100% 
average % 
                 N 
0 
0 
13 
56 
91 
69 
1
3
10
12
72 
26
28
32
23
14
44 
97
9
28
30
22
53
89
30
8
4
0
20 
42
36
36
0
0
24 
72
104 
107 
80 
106 
51 
397 
93 
86 
40 
30 
36 
249 
3
21
34
29
62 
87 
1999 0 - 24% 
25 - 49% 
50 - 74% 
75-100% 
average % 
   N 
0 
0 
9 
54 
92 
63 
0
3
15
16
75 
34
25 
36
23
14
44
98
12
29
30
25
55 
96
19
11
2
1
26 
33
29
51
0
0
29 
      80 
85 
130 
79 
110 
47 
404 
81 
104 
43 
29 
40 
254 
2
24
30
31
63 
87
 
Tables Q.23 and Q.20.2 show that minority employee ownership is quite frequent in all 
types of enterprises. This is not surprising since the first wave of large privatization in 
Lithuania resulted in widespread employee ownership in a high number of enterprises. 
Also the state keeps a share in most enterprises except foreign owned. Managers have 
quite high minority shares especially in employee owned enterprises and employees have 
high shares in manager owned enterprises. 
 
Like in Estonia and Latvia minority ownership by employees is less frequent in foreign 
owned enterprises and most frequent in management owned and non-majority 
enterprises. Insiders taken together have on average a majority of the ownership in no-
majority enterprises. The lowest percentage of non-owning employees is found in 
enterprises with employee majority ownership. In Lithuania there is in general a higher 
number of employee owners than in Estonia and Latvia, but the number of non-owning 
employees is increasing over the period, and the share totally owned by other employees 
is also falling from 1993 to 1999.  
 
Looking at the distribution among the employee owners in table Q.23, it is most un-equal 
in enterprises with manager majority. Like in Estonia new enterprises have a quite high 
degree of equality among the employee owners.  
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Table Q.23 Distribution of Ownership on Employees 
                  \ ownership 
average per enterprise 
state  for-
eign  
domes
-tic  
mana-
ger  
em-
ployee 
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
% non-owning 
employees 
1993 
   N 
61 
(89) 
76 
(14) 
54 
(47) 
65 
(44) 
24 
(45) 
37   
(55) 
51 
(294) 
38 
(96) 
71 
(44) 
% non-owning 
employees 
1996 
   N 
69 
(69) 
94 
(27) 
63 
(97) 
64 
(89) 
43 
(42) 
39   
(74) 
61 
(398) 
46 
(238) 
94 
(87) 
% non-owning 
employees 
1999 
   N 
74 
(63) 
93 
(34) 
67 
(98) 
66 
(96) 
34 
(33) 
58   
(80) 
66 
(404) 
54 
(254) 
93 
(87) 
rather equal 
 
 
(Pct) 
6   
(23) 
7   
(54) 
20 
(27) 
14 
(16) 
  9 
(28) 
  5   
(7) 
61 
(20) 
34 
(14) 
21 
(42) 
unequal (more than 1:2) 
(Pct) 
8   
(31) 
2   
(15) 
21   
(28) 
16  
(19) 
12   
(36) 
33     
(43) 
92  
(30) 
72   
(30) 
14  
(28) 
very unequal (> 1:10) 
(Pct) 
12   
(46) 
4   
(31) 
35 
(45) 
55 
(65) 
12   
(36) 
38   
(50) 
156 
(50) 
132 
(56) 
15   
(30) 
N  26 13 74 85 33 76 309 238 50 
 
Table Q.20.2 Ownergroups and minority ownership by other groups 1993-1999   
1993 \majority ownership 
average % owned by  
state fo-
reign 
do-
mestic
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
noma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
state/municipal 94 0.7 6 3 6 21       44 42 1
foreign 0.0 78 3 2 0 5 5 1 27
domestic external owner 0.8 5.3 73 4 6 23 17 21 10
managers 0.5 16 8 75 16 23 15 12 52
other employees 4.7 0.1 10 16 72 28 19 24 10
total   100   100   100   100  100  100   100 100 100
1996 \majority ownership 
average % owned by  
state fo-
reign 
do-
mestic
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
noma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
state/municipal 91 0.7 5 4 4 17 22 13 1
foreign 0.3 78 4 1 0 3 7 2 25
domestic external owner 2.3 11 73 6 4 23 26 34 20
managers 1.2 9 8 74 21 28 25 24 45
other employees 5.2 1 10 15 71 29 20 27 9
total   100   100   100   100  100  100   100 100 100
1999\ majority ownership 
average % owned by  
state fo-
reign 
do-
mestic
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
noma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
state/municipal 93 1 4 3 2 15 19 9 1
foreign 1 81 3 2 0 6 9 5 26
domestic external owner 1 11 78 7 5 28 28 38 20
managers 1 6 7 75 20 26 27 26 43
other employees 4 1 8 13 73 25 17 22 10
total   100   100   100   100  100  100   100 100 100
All companies have the same weight when measuring the average 
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Table Q. 8  Number of competitors on Ownership  
           \ownership 
frequency 
state   foreign domes-
tic  
mana-
ger  
Em-
ployee 
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
0    2 2 0 0 1 0 5 1 2
1-5 25 1 6 6 7 9 54 40 5
5-20 32 3 15 3 9 22 84 61 8
20- 12 2 5 7 6 5 37 30 4
1993 
Total number 
of competitors 
N 71 8 26 16 23 36 180 132 19
0    1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0
1-5 14 3 21 8 4 11 61 37 12
5-20 18 7 30 17 11 25 108 79 16
20- 7 5 19 14 7 8 60 42 12
1996 
Total number 
of competitors 
N 40 15 71 39 22 44 231 159 40
0    1 
(3) 
0 
(0)
2 
(3)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
3 
(1) 
2 
(1) 
0 
(0)
1-5 8 
(24) 
4 
(19) 
17 
(23)
1 
(2)
4 
(24)
9 
(17)
43 
(18) 
28 
(17) 
6 
(14)
5-20 15 
(45) 
11 
(53)
32 
(43)
25 
(56)
6 
(38)
24 
(44)
113 
(48) 
77 
(46) 
22 
(53)
20- 6 
(18) 
6 
(29)
23 
(31)
19 
(42)
6 
(38)
21 
(39)
84 
(33) 
61 
(36) 
14 
(33)
1999 
Total number 
of competitors 
N 33 21 74 45 16 54 243 168 42
0    2 0 6 1 0 4 13 11 0
1-5 11 9 25 6 6 19 76 51 13
5-20 12 6 24 20 5 13 80 54 16
20- 8 4 17 17 5 16 67 49 10
1999 
Number of 
domestic 
competitors 
N 33 19 72 44 16 52 236 165 39
0    4 3 4 2 0 0 13 6 3
1-5 3 3 11 6 5 18 46 34 8
5-20 1 4 8 6 0 9 28 20 6
20- 0 3 3 2 1 1 10 8 2
1999 
Number of 
foreign 
competitors 
N 8 13 26 16 6 28 97 68 19
 
The number of competitors is slightly increasing over time. Part of this development is 
related to privatization since state owned firms have a higher share of companies with 
quite few competitors, and privatization is often accompanied with increasing 
competition. In 1999 also domestic externally owned enterprises have relatively many 
firms with a low number of competitors. Manager owned enterprises have on average the 
highest number of competitors. Not surprisingly, foreign owned enterprises have the 
highest proportion of foreign competitors, while state owned enterprises mention 
relatively limited competition from abroad. 
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4.  Board structure and management 
Table Q.1b   Who appointed top-management            (frequency and column %)    
          \ ownership 1999 
manager appointed by
State  for-
eign
domes
-tic
mana-
ger
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority
total priva-
tized
 
new 
 
state authority 29 (45)
0 
(0)
5 
(5)
10 
(10)
4 
(12)
10 
(12,5)
58 
(14)
26 
(10)
2 
(2) 
labor collective 0 (0) 
1 
(3)
4 
(4)
6 
(6)
2 
(6)
1 
(2)
14 
(4) 
10 
(4) 
4 
(4) 
shareholders 17 (22) 
14 
(41)
26 
(27)
50 
(52)
11 
(33)
19 
(23)
137 
(34) 
66 
(26) 
57 
(66) 
company board 13 (20) 
14 
(41)
53 
(53)
25 
(26)
13 
(39)
40    
(50)
158 
(39) 
128 
(50) 
18 
(21) 
other 5 (13) 
5 
(15)
10 
(11)
5 
(5)
3 
(9)
10    
(12,5)
38 
(9) 
24 
(9) 
6 
(7) 
total N  64 (100) 
34 
(100)
98 
(100)
96 
(100)
33 
(100)
80 
(100)
405 
(100) 
254 
(100) 
87 
(100)
 
In all types of enterprises, except state owned, the company board or the shareholders 
had the dominating role concerning appointment of management. The distinction 
between shareholders and board is probably not so important. It is worth noting that in 
Lithuania the state and the labour collective played a stronger role than it was the case in 
Estonia and Latvia. 
 
Table Q.1c    When was top-management appointed   (frequency and column %)  
 \ownership 1999 
manager appointed
state   foreign domes-
tic
mana-
ger
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority
total priva-
tized
new 
 
-1989 12 
(19)
2 
(6)
11 
(11)
13 
(14)
8 
(24)
15 
(19)
   61 
(15)
  50 
(19)
1 
(1) 
1990 4 
(6) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(2)
6 
(6)
1 
(3)
3 
(4)
16 
(4) 
10 
(4) 
3 
(3)
 
1991 4 
(6) 
2 
(6) 
3 
(4)
9 
(10)
1 
(3)
8 
(10)
27 
(7) 
14 
(5) 
7 
(8)
 
1992 6 
(9) 
4 
(12) 
10 
(11)
11 
(12)
3 
(9)
10 
(13)
44 
(11) 
30 
(12) 
9 
(10)
 
1993 2 
(3) 
8 
(24) 
6 
(6)
12 
(13)
4 
(12)
8 
(10)
40 
(10) 
27 
(11) 
11 
(13)
 
1994 2 
(3) 
2 
(6) 
10 
(11)
11 
(12)
1 
(3)
4 
(5)
30 
(8) 
19 
(7) 
10 
(11)
 
1995 6 
(9) 
4 
(12) 
9 
(9)
15 
(16)
2 
(6)
3 
(3)
39 
(10) 
17 
(6) 
16 
(18)
 
1996 7 
(11) 
3 
(9) 
7 
(7)
5 
(5)
0 
(0)
4 
(5)
26 
(7) 
10 
(4) 
10 
(11)
 
1997 8 
(13) 
1 
(3) 
6 
(6)
2 
(2)
4 
(12)
7 
(9)
28 
(7) 
19 
(7) 
2 
(2)
 
1998 5 
(8) 
3 
(9) 
10 
(7)
4 
(4)
2 
(6)
6 
(8)
30 
(8) 
18 
(7) 
6 
(7)
 
1999 4 
(6) 
5 
(15) 
16 
(18)
7 
(7)
4 
(12)
10 
(13)
46 
(11) 
32 
(12) 
9 
(10)
 
2000* 4 
(6) 
0 
(0) 
8 
(9)
1 
(1)
3 
(9)
2 
(3)
18 
(4) 
8 
(4) 
3 
(3)
 
total N 64 
(100)
34 
(100)
98 
(100)
96 
(100)
33 
(100)
80 
(100)
405 
(100)
254 
(100)
87 
(100)
Gray boxes are medians. *The survey was done in the spring 2000, so here is included less than half a year. 
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Compared with the results from Estonia and Latvia more Lithuanian managers have 
survived from the time before 1991. State owned, employee owned, no majority, and 
privatized enterprises in general have the highest percentages of managers appointed up 
to 1989. The median appointment years are marked with gray background. Insider 
owned companies had the median appointments in 1993 together with privatized 
enterprises in general, while the other groups had the medians one or two years later.  It 
is worth noting that the state owned enterprises has caught up in shifting managers in the 
later years. 
 
Table Q3.1-93 Composition of company board 1993 on 1993 ownership   
            \ ownership 1993 
average %seats representing 
 
state 
 
fo-
reign 
 
do-
mestic
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
state/municipal   11    0    2     0   2    5    5 3 1 
foreign    0  52    0    0    0    1    2 1 23 
domestic external owner    6    0   25    10    1   15    10 12 8 
managers    48   40    52    60   54   49    51 53 47 
other employees    36     8    21    30   43   30    32 31 21 
total   100   100   100   100  100  100   100 100 100 
total N with seats > 1     79    7    35    20   38    52   231 186 49 
average number of seats     4.8    4.4    5.2    4.3    4.8    4.2  4.7    4.8    4.3 
no board or no answer*     75    8    13   27    7    4   134    58    28
Total N 154 15 48 47 45 56 365 164 47
*No cases in Lithuania reported 1 member of the board. 
 
Table Q3.1-99 Composition of company board 1999 on 1999 ownership  
            \ ownership 1999 
average %seats representing 
 
state  
 
fo-
reign 
 
do-
mestic
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
state/municipal     11     2    2    1    4   1    5    2    1 
Foreign    0    30    1    0    0    0 7    1   18 
domestic external owner    0    0   30   6    4    9   9   11   16 
Managers    51    61   52   62   39   54   53   52    49 
other employees   38     7   15    31   52   36   26   34   26 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
total N with seats > 1     43     16   74   50  26    66 275   200   28 
average number of seats    4.9    4.4     4.3     4.3     5.1     4.8 4.6     4.5     4.3
no board or no answer*     21     18     24     46     7     14    130     47     59
Total N 64 34 98 96 33 80 405 254 87
*No cases in Lithuania reported 1 member of the board. 
 
The tables Q3.1 shows the representation in the average board in Lithuania. The majority 
of the seats is taken by managers and a quarter by other employees (1999). The 
remaining groups have on average quite low representation in the boards. From 1993 to 
1999 foreign owners have increased their representation from 2 to 9 percent, while other 
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employees have fallen from 32% to 26%. The average board had in 1999 4.6 members. 
On average managers had in 1999 a majority of seats in all companies except employee 
owned. Other employees had a strong position when they had majority, but they were 
also quite strongly represented in state and manager owned as well as no majority 
enterprises, while weakly represented in foreign owned enterprises.  
  
There is a clear connection between representation in the company board and majority 
ownership for all owner-groups except state owned companies, which are represented to 
a very high degree by managers and other employees. This is quite similar to the results 
from Estonia and Latvia. But insiders have an even stronger position in Lithuania, and in 
Estonia and Latvia foreign owners dominated the boards in foreign owned enterprises.  
 
Table Q3.2-93    Board majority on ownership majority 1993 - seats > 1   
            \ ownership 1993 
majority board 1993 
 
state  
 
for-
eign 
 
dom. 
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
state/municipal 5 0 0 0 0 1 6 2 0  
Foreign 0 4 0 0 0     0  4 0 5  
domestic external owner 2 0 9 2 0 4 17 16 1  
Managers 26 1 16 10 16 21 90 77 5  
other employees 40 2 8 8 21 19 98 77 37  
no majority 6 0 2 0 1 7 16 14 0  
Total 79 7 35 20 38 52 231 186 49 
 
Table Q3.2-99    Board majority on ownership majority 1999 - seats > 1   
        \majority ownership 
majority board 1999 
 
state  
 
for-
eign 
 
domes
-tic 
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
state/municipal 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0  
Foreign 0 5 1 0 0 0 6 1 5  
domestic external owner 0 0 10 1 1 3 15 14 1  
Managers 9 4 25 18 6 20 87 69 5  
other employees 13 2 15 17 17 23 82 68 10  
no majority 17 5 23 14 2 20 81 47 7  
total  43 16 74 50 26 66 275 200 28 
 
The tables Q3.2-93 and -99 represent matrices combining the majority of board 
representation with majority ownership. The shaded diagonal describes the situation 
where majority ownership follows majority board control. For 1993 there is a direct 
connection for 49 out of the 179 cases with majority ownership (28%). 9 with no single 
group having majority, and 121 with another group having the majority. For 1999 it is 54 
out of 209 (26%). 61 with no single group having majority, and 94 with another group 
having the majority.  
 
In both 1993 and 1999 the correspondence is strongest for employee ownership with 
correspondence in 65% of the cases. Manager ownership has also quite high 
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correspondence (36%) and for foreign it is 31%. For state ownership the correspondence 
is only 9%, and for domestic external it is 14%. These results are quite similar to Estonia 
and Latvia. In most cases when the majority owner does not have majority in the board 
instead insiders dominate the board. Other employees are surprisingly strongly 
represented in the boards with a majority in 30% of the enterprises in 1999, although 
they only have a direct majority of ownership in less than 10% of the 275 enterprises 
included in the table. We assume that many of the employees in the boards are 
specialists, with positions quite close to management. Like in Estonian and Latvia this is 
supported by the results on the influence of different groups, see below.  
 
The managers were asked to estimate the influence of different groups on a scale from 1 
= some influence to 4 = no influence. From the table below it can be seen that there are 
quite limited differences between the results for 1993 and 1999. 
 
In general managers are considered to have the highest influence on decisions. The 
lowest influence for managers is on the selection of managers. Here has the relevant 
owner group the same level of influence (quite the same as in Estonia and Latvia).  In 
1999 the owners have increased their influence in this area compared with 1993. The 
owners also have some say in relation to long term plans. However, only for foreign 
ownership the influence of the owners are on the same level as managers’ influence. 
When they are owners, managers have slightly more influence concerning all the areas of 
decisions. Other employees also have slightly more influence on long term plans and 
selection of managers, when they also are majority owners (1999). However, for 
decisions concerning wage levels and safety and health, they have a higher degree of 
influence in state owned enterprises, and in no majority enterprises than it is the case in 
majority employee owned enterprises. The highest rating for employee influence is like 
in Estonia and Latvia for safety and health. In general employees are rated third after 
managers and the majority owners. They are far from the influence level of managers 
even in majority employee owned firms.  
 
Banks have nearly no influence, and surprisingly there seems not to be an increase in 
bank influence from 1993 to 1999. Domestic private external owners do not seem to 
have much influence and this is also the case when they are majority owners. Foreign 
owners are by far the strongest external owner group. State representatives are perceived 
to have very little influence in all groups except for state owned enterprises where they 
are perceived to have some influence on strategic decisions. (This result is different from 
Estonia and Latvia, where state owned enterprises also had a weak position even in state 
owned enterprises).  
 
There are no significant differences between the firms when categorized on origin. 
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Table Q.13-93  Different groups influence on decisions on ownership1993 
   \majority ownership 
average of 1 (high) to 4 
state  foreign domes-
tic 
em-
ployee
mana-
ger 
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
1.  long term plans 
managers
1.51 1.27 1.30 1.60 1.08 1.09 1.35 1.32 1.16 
Other employees 3.06 3.72 3.26 2.88 3.36 2.90 3.09 2.99 3.39 
domestic priv. ext. own 3.77 3.72 3.02 3.57 3.73 3.09 3.52 3.40 3.65 
Banks 3.80 3.90 3.69 3.44 3.73 3.62 3.70 3.67 3.69 
foreign owners         3.96 1.63 3.92 3.97 4.00 3.85 3.87 3.93 3.46 
state representatives 2.68 4.00 3.54 3.15 3.76 3.48 3.19 3.34 3.79 
2.  manager selection 
managers
2.77 2.63 2.11 2.42 1.95 2.38 2.45 2.38 1.83 
other employees 3.15 3.81 3.50 2.75 3.28 3.22 3.19 3.02 3.58 
domestic priv. ext. own 3.82 3.72 2.47 3.57 3.76 2.83 3.42 3.26 3.62 
banks 3.99 3.90 3.90 3.97 4.00 3.92 3.96 3.95 4.00 
foreign owners         3.99 1.63 4.00 3.97 4.00 3.88 3.89 3.95 3.46 
state representatives 2.44 4.00 3.90 3.62 3.84 3.29 3.19 3.46 3.90 
3. employment 
managers
1.34 1.18 1.21 1.33 1.23 1.11 1.26 1.22 1.23 
other employees  3.06 4.00 3.38 3.20 3.50 3.24 3.24 3.19 3.60 
domestic priv. ext. own 3.86 3.81 2.28 3.68 3.86 3.40 3.68 3.59 3.81 
banks 3.99 4.00 3.88 3.97 3.97 3.90 3.96 3.95 3.97 
foreign owners          3.99 2.00 3.92 3.97 4.00 3.98 3.91 3.96 3.55 
state representatives  3.14 4.00 3.78 3.71 3.82 3.75 3.53 3.65 3.81 
4. wage-levels 
managers
1.41 1.00 1.26 1.37 1.21 1.11 1.29 1.26 1.13 
other employees  2.96 4.00 3.54 3.11 3.54 3.00 3.20 3.18 3.65 
domestic priv. ext. own 3.82 3.81 3.30 3.73 3.82 3.44 3.67 3.58 3.76 
Banks 3.96 4.00 3.88 3.97 3.97 3.94 3.95 3.96 3.97 
foreign owners          3.99 1.81 4.00 3.97 4.00 4.00 3.92 3.98 3.48 
state representatives  2.79 3.81 3.69 3.57 3.43 3.59 3.28 3.42 3.60 
5. safety and health 
managers
1.34 1.00 1.40 1.31 1.30 1.11 1.28 1.28 1.23 
other employees  2.58 3.45 2.95 2.77 3.06 2.66 2.76 2.70 3.27 
domestic priv. ext. own 3.91 4.00 3.66 3.84 3.89 3.75 3.84 3.80 3.93 
Banks 3.99 4.00 3.95 3.97 4.00 3.96 3.98 3.97 4.00 
foreign owners         3.97 3.63 4.00 3.97 4.00 3.98 3.97 3.98 3.91 
state representatives  3.03 3.72 3.59 3.35 3.41 3.51 3.31 3.40 3.69 
 N 132 11 46 46 45 54 334 232 43 
1=high, 2=some, 3=low, 4=no influence, missing = 4 if some of the category has been answered
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Table Q.13-99  Different groups influence on decisions on ownership1999 
   \majority ownership 
average of 1 (high) to 4 
state  foreign domes-
tic 
em-
ployee
mana-
ger 
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
1.  long term plans 
managers
1.51 1.70 1.37 1.54 1.16 1.21 1.36 1.29 1.47 
Other employees 3.15 3.55 3.10 2.75 3.13 2.95 3.09 3.01 3.31 
domestic priv. ext. own 3.75 3.52 2.51 3.42 3.74 3.25 3.31 3.15 3.47 
Banks 3.79 3.64 3.48 3.48 3.46 3.40 3.52 3.49 3.47 
foreign owners         3.93 1.61 3.75 3.93 3.83 3.85 3.66 3.77 3.13 
state representatives 2.09 4.00 3.51 3.57 3.70 3.36 3.36 3.53 3.80 
2.  manager selection 
managers
3.17 2.79 2.55 2.39 2.00 2.35 2.50 2.40 2.34 
other employees 3.40 3.70 3.45 2.51 3.31 3.12 3.29 3.14 3.63 
domestic priv. ext. own 3.87 3.52 2.27 3.60 3.62 2.95 3.20 2.95 3.41 
banks 3.98 4.00 3.90 3.90 3.97 3.97 3.96 3.95 3.95 
foreign owners         3.98 1.61 3.87 3.96 3.89 3.83 3.71 3.82 3.19 
state representatives 1.81 4.00 3.82 3.93 3.90 3.60 3.51 3.79 3.93 
3. employment 
managers
1.29 1.44 1.31 1.42 1.17 1.25 1.27 1.23 1.37 
other employees  3.17 3.88 3.30 2.96 3.37 3.17 3.30 3.27 3.47 
domestic priv. ext. own 3.79 3.76 2.83 3.66 3.83 3.48 3.49 3.37 3.60 
banks 3.98 4.00 3.85 3.90 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.89 
foreign owners          3.98 2.02 3.83 3.96 3.88 3.88 3.74 3.84 3.27 
state representatives  2.78 4.00 3.77 3.66 3.72 3.76 3.61 3.75 3.82 
4. wage-levels 
managers
1.34 1.50 1.32 1.51 1.15 1.23 1.29 1.26 1.34 
other employees  2.96 3.67 3.20 2.90 3.35 2.98 3.17 3.14 3.45 
domestic priv. ext. own 3.79 3.58 3.02 3.75 3.78 3.41 3.52 3.43 3.55 
Banks 3.98 4.00 3.87 3.90 3.92 3.92 3.93 3.94 3.88 
foreign owners          3.98 1.91 3.90 3.96 3.85 3.92 3.75 3.87 3.21 
state representatives  2.56 3.85 3.57 3.36 3.58 3.62 3.43 3.56 3.67 
5. safety and health 
managers
1.17 1.38 1.32 1.21 1.16 1.16 1.23 1.22 1.33 
other employees  2.40 3.14 2.69 2.69 2.73 2.50 2.65 2.59 2.96 
domestic priv. ext. own 3.89 3.91 3.57 3.78 3.86 3.78 3.79 3.75 3.81 
Banks 3.98 4.00 3.98 3.90 3.97 3.95 3.97 3.98 3.93 
foreign owners         3.98 3.02 3.95 3.96 3.90 3.95 3.87 3.92 3.64 
state representatives  2.78 3.47 3.44 3.36 3.45 3.48 3.35 3.44 3.56 
 N 64 34 98 96 33 80 405 254 87 
1=high, 2=some, 3=low, 4=no influence, missing = 4 if some of the category has been answered  
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Table Q.11   Percent membership of unions - on ownership  
\majority ownership 
union membership 
state  foreign domes-
tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
average % 1993 
N
25 
110
0 
13
15
46
6 
45
16 
45
23 
55
18 
314
20 
212
0 
43 
 1996 
   N 
16 
72 
2 
27
15 
97
4
89
5 
42
19 
75
11 
402 
14 
254 
0 
87 
 1999 
   N 
   22 
64
9 
34
  13 
98
3 
96
11 
33
15 
      80 
12 
405 
13 
254 
0.004 
87
0%  1993 62 
(65)
13 
(100)
31 
(67)
39 
(86)
31 
(69)
32 
(58)
208 
(66)
131 
(62)
43 
(100)
]0-100%[ 1993 
  
48 
(44) 
0 
(0)
15 
(33)
6 
(14)
14 
(31)
23 
(42)
106 
(34) 
81 
(38) 
0 
(0)
100% 1993 
    
0 
(0) 
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0)
0%  1999 35 
(55)
27 
(79)
64 
(65)
86 
(90)
26 
(79)
49 
(61)
283 
(70)
169 
(67)
86 
(99)
]0-100%[ 1999 
  
29 
(45) 
7 
(21)
34 
(35)
10 
(10)
7 
(21)
31 
(39)
119 
(30) 
85 
(33) 
1 
(1)
100% 1999 
    
0 
(0) 
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0)
 
 Table Q.12  Procedures for employee influence - 1999  
       \majority ownership 
 
state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
no other procedures  
      (than through unions)  
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
yes, other procedures 64 
(100) 
34 
(100)
98 
(100)
96 
(100)
33 
(100)
80 
(100)
405 
(100) 
254 
(100) 
87 
(100)
importance for influence  
trade unions                     1 
                                     2-3 
                   not relevant  4 
                                       N 
                   average         
 
0 
25 
39 
64 
3,36 
1
3
30
34
3,79
5
20
73
98
3,56
1
6
89
96
3,84
0
5
28
33
3,72
2
27
51
80
3,38
 
8 
86 
310 
405 
3,59 
 
6 
60 
188 
254 
3,54 
1
2
84
87
3,93
employees as                  1 
shareholders                2-3 
                   not relevant  4 
                                       N 
                   average         
3 
14 
47 
64 
3,51 
5
4
25
34
3,38
30
31
37
98
2,58
45
27
24
96
2,07
17
6
10
33
2,18
37
27
16
80
2,06
137 
109 
159 
405 
2,54 
105 
87 
62 
254 
2,21 
28
13
46
87
2,78
other structure                 1 
                                     2-3 
                   not relevant  4 
                                       N 
                   average         
25 
11 
28 
64 
2,48 
10
8
16
34
2.67
25
17
56
98
2,94
9
23
64
96
3,32
2
10
21
33
3,27
14
20
46
80
3,11
85 
89 
231 
405 
3,00 
50 
55 
149 
254 
3,07 
9
24
54
87
3,21
Missing values included as “not relevant” (4) if there are other response for that firm that year. 
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The results concerning union membership are quite similar to the results from 
Estonia and Latvia. Membership of unions is in general very low and slightly 
falling over time. The membership level is significantly higher for state owned 
enterprises. Employee owned enterprises have quite low union membership. There 
are no unions in the new enterprises. 
 
Not surprisingly unions do not play an important role for employee influence for 
any of the ownership types. In many companies with employee-shares, share 
ownership is considered to be an important channel for employee influence. This is 
the case for about half of the responses for majority employee owned enterprises. 
However, it is worth noting that also in quite many of the majority management 
owned, in the externally domestic owned enterprises and in no-majority enterprises, 
shareholding is perceived as an important channel for employee influence. The 
average score for employee influence as shareholders is in fact slightly higher for 
management and no majority enterprises than for employee owned. This indicates 
that the division between management owned and employee owned enterprises is 
not so distinct, and that in the group of no-majority a group of majority insider 
ownership could be defined. 
   
5.  Compensation systems 
Table Q4bc-1 Manager compensation depending on company results 
frequency   (percentage)     1993     1996     1999 
A.  depend on results  256  (79)  346  (86)  348  (86) 
      N  314 (100)  401 (100)  405 (100) 
B. depending on profit   199  (61)   242  (61)   238  (60)  
     depending on sales     74  (23)   106  (27)   110  (27) 
     other     54  (16)     49  (12)     52  (13) 
     N   327 (100)   397 (100)   400 (100) 
C. 0%            of total pay    49  (16)    55  (14)    56  (14) 
     0-24%   of total pay    51  (16)    70  (17)    61  (15) 
     25-49% of total pay    35  (11)    42   (11)    43   (11) 
     50-99% of total pay    63   (20)    81   (20)    91   (23) 
     100% of total pay  116   (37)  153   (38)   153   (38) 
      N  314   (100)    401  (100)    404 (100) 
 
Result-dependent compensation for managers is quite important for all three years 
with no significant change over time. Profit related compensation is used in around 
60% of the enterprises, and sales related in about 25% of the enterprises. This is 
much more widespread than in Estonia and Latvia. Only in around 15% of the 
enterprises it makes no part of total pay for the managers. In around 60% of the 
enterprises performance related pay makes out 50% or more of the total 
management compensation. Result related compensation has a very high frequency 
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for all the owner-groups with state owned enterprises slightly below the rest. In 
most cases it depends on profits, and this is especially the case in management and 
domestic externally owned enterprises. Profit related compensation is less frequent 
in state, foreign and employee owned enterprises.  
 
Table Q.4bc-2  Manager compensation depending on results - ownership 1999 
               \ownership 
frequency     (%) 
state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no 
maj. 
total priva-
tized 
new 
A. depend on results 50 
(78)
31 
(91)
79 
(81)
85 
(89)
31 
(94)
72 
(90)
  348 
(86)
221 
(87)
79 
(97)
      N 64 
(100) 
34 
(100)
98 
(100)
96 
(100)
33 
(100)
80 
(100)
405 
(100) 
254 
(100) 
81 
(100)
B. depending on profit 32 
(51)
18 
(53)
63 
(67)
60 
(63)
17 
(52)
48 
(61)
238 
(60)
158 
(62)
51 
(60)
     depending on sales 14 
(22) 
13 
(38)
21 
(22)
24 
(26)
12 
(36)
26 
(33)
110 
(27) 
70 
(27) 
27 
(32)
     other 17 
(27) 
3 
(9)
12 
(11)
11 
(12)
4 
(12)
5 
(06
52 
(13) 
27 
(11) 
7 
(8)
     N 63 
(100) 
34 
(100)
96 
(100)
95 
(100)
33 
(100)
79 
(100)
400 
(100) 
255 
(100) 
85 
(100)
C. 0%      of total pay 14 
(22)
3 
(9)
19 
(20)
11 
(11)
2 
(6)
7 
(9)
58 
(14)
36 
(14)
7 
(8)
    0-24% of total pay 8 
(13) 
2 
(6)
18 
(19)
19 
(20)
8 
(24)
6 
(8)
61 
(15) 
39 
(15) 
15 
(17)
    25-49% of total pay 5 
(8) 
3 
(9)
17 
(19)
4 
(4)
5 
(15)
9 
(11)
43 
(11) 
33 
(13) 
6 
(7)
  50-99% of total pay 12 
(19) 
8 
(24)
25 
(27)
24 
(25)
4 
(12)
19 
(23)
92 
(23) 
61 
(24) 
17 
(20)
     100% of total pay 25 
(39) 
18 
(53)
19 
(20)
38 
(40)
14 
(42)
39 
(49)
163 
(40) 
85 
(35) 
41 
(48)
      N 64 
(100)
34 
(100)
98 
(100)
96 
(100)
33 
(100)
80 
(100)
405 
(100)
254 
(100)
86 
(100)
 
Table Q4a-1  Average monthly salary - over time 
mean           standard deviation 1993 1996 1999 
topmanager - EEK  
N
878        775      
316
2540       2077 
401
4133     3791 
404
all employees - EEK 
N
 295       183 
         316
 710        320 
        401
 1049        1149 
          404 
the lowest paid employee  
N
144        90 
         316
  321       104 
        401
 464        110 
          404 
topmanager/all employees 3.13          1.99 3.44           1.99 3.89           2.45 
all employees/lowest paid 2.41          1.73 2.27           0.95 2.29           1.66 
average wage for Lithuania 166 618 987 
 
The pay for the lowest employee is very low even for Lithuanian standards, but 
although we asked about full time wage, some responses may cover part time 
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employees. The average monthly salary has increased considerably over the period. 
For managers the increase has been stronger, and the differential between managers 
and other employees has increased during the 1990’es. 
 
Table Q.5-99   Average monthly salary on ownership - 1999  
    \majority ownership 
                  EEK 
state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
New 
topmanager - mean  
standard deviation 
N 
4071 
2877 
  64 
8650
7977
   34
3954
2754
  98
  3060
2650
  96
2633
1876
  33
4484
3186
  79
4133 
3791 
  404 
3983 
3083 
  254 
 4587
5768
   86
all employees, mean 
standard deviation 
N 
 1099 
 465 
    64 
  1977
  3665
    34
 934
 318
  98
  915
  403
   96
879
410
  33
  1011
372
  79
 1049 
 1149 
 404 
1034 
1387 
  254 
 1051
 556
 86
lowest paid employee 
standard deviation 
N 
 486 
   132 
   64 
 521
 134
   34
 453
  57
  98
 439
  57
  96
447 
  65
   33
 474
 168
    79
 464 
110 
 404 
 454 
  102 
  254 
477 
 111
   86
topmanager/employee 
standard deviation 
3,54 
1,48 
5,87
4,11
4,12
2,24
3,09
1,73
3,05 
 1,89
4,36
2,81
3,89 
2,45 
4,04 
2,58 
3,68
2,57
average/lowest paid 
standard deviation 
2,35 
1,31 
4,09
2,55
2,05
0,64
2,07
0,84
1,98
0,94
2,19
0,78
2,29 
2,66 
2,31 
3,12 
2,20
1,11
 
The wage differential between managers and all employees are bigger in Lithuania 
than in Estonia and Latvia, but this can probably be explained by the larger average 
size of the companies in the Lithuanian sample. Like in the other Baltic countries 
foreign owned enterprises have the highest salary level for both managers and other 
employees, but also the highest differential between the two groups. This is 
different from the situation in Estonia and Latvia. Manager and employee owned 
enterprises have lower salaries for managers, which can partly be explained by 
lower average size. The average wage for al employees are also in the lower end for 
these firms. This is similar to the results for the other Baltic countries. Domestic 
externally owned enterprises also have averages wages for all employees in the 
lower end of the scale. State owned and no-majority enterprises follow the average. 
There are no significant differences between private and new except that privatized 
enterprises have lower salary levels for managers. This is especially notable 
because privatized are on average much bigger than new enterprises 
 
6.  Restructuring 
The questions on restructuring are broader in the manager surveys in Estonia and 
Latvia. The frequency of change, especially major changes, of all categories is 
increasing over time. Most frequent is organizational change with 67% of the cases 
in the period 1997-99 and 74% of the cases over the total period, 48% as major 
changes. The difference between categories is not significant, except that most 
major changes of products took place in 1994-96. The weight has turned more 
toward major change in production methods for the last period. Over the whole 
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period 24% has at least made a minor change in the production process while 40% 
has made a major change. 
 
Table Q10.1   Indicators of restructuring  - over time 
frequency     (percentage)     1991-3     1994-6     1997-9 1993-99* 
products 
 
0 = no change 
1 = minor change 
2 = major change 
mean 
230    (68) 
  93    (25) 
  22    (7) 
0.37  (100)
206    (51) 
141    (35) 
  56    (14) 
0.63  (100)
195    (48) 
121    (30)  
  89    (22) 
0.74   (100)
176    (43) 
  67    (17) 
162    (40) 
0,96  (100) 
production 
process 
0 = no change 
1 = minor change 
2 = major change 
mean 
202    (60) 
113    (34) 
  20    (6) 
0.45 (100) 
175    (43) 
164    (41) 
  64    (16) 
0.72  (100) 
148    (37) 
155    (38) 
102    (25) 
0.88   (100) 
128    (31) 
  96    (24) 
181    (45) 
1,13  (100) 
suppliers 0 = no change 
1 = minor change 
2 = major change 
mean 
196    (58) 
120    (36) 
  19    (6) 
0.47  (100)
175    (43) 
164    (41) 
  64    (16) 
0.72  (100)
170    (42) 
154    (38)  
  81    (20) 
0.78   (100)
146    (36) 
111    (27) 
148    (36) 
1,00  (100) 
markets 0 = no change 
1 = minor change 
2 = major change 
mean 
211    (63) 
  98    (29) 
  26    (8) 
0.44  (100)
183    (45) 
159    (40) 
  61    (15) 
0.69  (100)
179    (44) 
151    (37)  
  75    (19) 
0.74   (100)
148    (37) 
  89    (22) 
168    (42) 
1,05  (100) 
organization 0 = no change 
1 = minor change 
2 = major change 
mean 
191    (57) 
107    (32) 
  37    (11) 
0.54  (100)
166    (41) 
177    (44) 
  60    (15) 
0.73  (100)
135    (33) 
171    (42)  
  99    (25) 
0.91  (100)
107    (26) 
103    (25) 
195    (48) 
1,22  (100) 
             Total N 335 403 405 405 
*1993-99  0=no change, 1=at least one minor change and no major, 2=at least one major change   
 
There are some interesting findings when looking at the different types of 
restructuring divided on ownership structure. Foreign owned enterprises have more 
changes in products and production process than the rest of the group, while these 
enterprises have a lower degree of organizational change and lower effort in finding 
new suppliers. State owned enterprises are in the lower end concerning all types of 
restructuring except organizational change where they follow the average pattern. 
Employee owned enterprises are lower concerning changing products and the 
production process and developing new markets, but are higher in relation to 
finding new suppliers. Manager owned enterprises are following the average except 
that they are a bit lower developing new products, but higher for finding new 
suppliers and developing new markets. No majority enterprises are relatively high 
on changing products and production processes as well as organizational change. 
Compared with new enterprises, privatized companies have higher change on all 
areas except developing new markets. This can probably be explained by the fact 
that new enterprises already adjust to the new situation in the start up process. 
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Table Q10.2  indicators of restructuring , minor and major changes 1993-99*  
\majority ownership 
1999 
state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
products   minor change 
% 
major change 
      % 
average value 
6     
(9) 
20 
(31) 
0.71 
6 
(18) 
18 
(53) 
1.23 
16 
(17) 
43 
(44) 
1.07 
20 
(21) 
33 
(33) 
0.87 
4 
(12) 
11 
(33) 
0.78 
15 
(19) 
38 
(48) 
1.13 
67 
(17) 
162 
(40) 
0.96 
44 
(17) 
113 
(44) 
1.05 
15 
(17) 
32 
(37) 
0.91 
production minor change 
% 
major change 
      % 
average value 
17 
(27) 
21 
(33) 
0.92 
9 
(27) 
18 
(53) 
1.32 
27 
(28) 
42 
(43) 
1.15 
22 
(23) 
42 
(44) 
1.10 
6 
(18) 
11 
(33) 
0.84 
15 
(19) 
47 
(59) 
1.36 
96 
(24) 
181 
(45) 
1.13 
55 
(21) 
129 
(50) 
1.22 
23 
(26) 
33 
(37) 
1.02 
suppliers  minor change 
% 
major change 
      % 
average value 
12 
(19) 
17 
(26) 
0.72 
6 
(18) 
10 
(29) 
0.76 
28 
(29) 
39 
(40) 
1.08 
28 
(29) 
43 
(44) 
1.18 
13 
(39) 
12 
(36) 
1.12 
24 
(30) 
27 
(34) 
0.97 
  111 
(27) 
148 
(36) 
1.00 
78 
(30) 
99 
(38) 
1.07 
20 
(26) 
36 
(42) 
1.05 
markets    minor change 
% 
major change 
      % 
average value 
12 
(19) 
18 
(28) 
0.75 
10 
(29) 
12 
(35) 
1.00 
22 
(23) 
43 
(44) 
1.12 
23 
(24) 
46 
(48) 
1.19 
9 
(27) 
9   
(27) 
0.81 
13 
(16) 
40 
(50) 
1.16 
89 
(22) 
168 
(42) 
1.05 
55 
(21) 
115 
(45) 
1.11 
23 
(26) 
37 
(43) 
1.11 
organization minor change 
% 
major change 
      % 
average value 
17 
(27) 
29 
(45) 
1.17 
5 
(12) 
14 
(44) 
0.97 
27 
(28) 
46 
(48) 
1.23 
22 
(23) 
47 
(49) 
1.26 
6 
(18) 
17 
(52) 
1.20 
26 
(33) 
42 
(53) 
1.37 
103 
(25) 
195 
(48) 
1.22 
64 
(25) 
138 
(54) 
1.32 
21 
(24) 
31 
(35) 
1.95 
N 64 33 98 96 33 80 405 254 87 
*1993-99  0=no change, 1=at least one minor change and no major, 2=at least one major change   
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Table Q10.3  Indicators of restructuring 1997-99 - on ownership 1999 
\majority ownership 
1999 
state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
products   minor change 
% 
 major change 
       % 
average value 
13 
(20) 
10 
(16) 
0,51 
11 
(32) 
12 
(35 
1,02 
30 
(33) 
24 
(25) 
0,78 
31 
(32) 
15 
(16) 
0,63 
7 
(21) 
7 
(21) 
  0,63 
29 
(36) 
21 
(26) 
0,88 
121 
(30) 
89 
(22) 
0,74 
80 
(31) 
63 
(25) 
0,80 
26 
(30) 
18 
(21) 
0,71 
production minor change 
% 
major change 
      % 
average value 
25 
(39) 
10 
(16) 
0,71 
14 
(41) 
12 
(35) 
1,11 
42 
(44) 
22 
(24) 
0,88 
33 
(34) 
26 
(27) 
0,88 
10 
(30)   
7   
(21) 
0,72 
31 
(39) 
25 
(31) 
1,01 
155 
(38) 
102 
(25) 
0,88 
101 
(39) 
72 
(28) 
0,95 
29 
(33) 
21 
(24) 
0,81 
suppliers  minor change 
% 
major change 
     % 
average value 
17 
(27) 
10 
(16) 
0,57 
6   
(17)   
7   
(21) 
0,58 
45 
(46) 
15 
(16) 
0,78 
40 
(42) 
24 
(25) 
0,91 
16 
(49)   
9   
(27) 
1,03 
30 
(38) 
16 
(20) 
0,77 
154 
(38) 
81 
(20) 
0,78 
110 
(43) 
52 
(20) 
0,83 
26 
(30) 
23 
(26) 
0,83 
markets    minor change 
% 
major change 
      % 
average value 
20 
(31)   
4     
(6) 
0,43 
11 
(32)   
8   
(24) 
0,79 
41 
(42) 
15 
(16) 
0,72 
42 
(44) 
21 
(22) 
0,87 
12 
(36)   
4   
(12) 
0,61 
25 
(31) 
23 
(29) 
0,88 
151 
(37) 
75 
(19) 
0,74 
100 
(39) 
51 
(20) 
0,78 
32 
(38) 
21 
(24) 
0,85 
organization minor change 
% 
 major change 
       % 
average value 
27 
(42) 
13 
(20) 
0,82 
10 
(29)   
6   
(18) 
0,64 
44 
(45) 
27 
(28) 
0,99 
38 
(40) 
23 
(24) 
0,87 
10 
(30) 
10 
(30) 
0,91 
42 
(53) 
20 
(25) 
1,05 
171 
(42) 
99 
(25) 
0,91 
112 
(44) 
73 
(28) 
1,00 
40 
(46) 
33 
(38) 
0,70 
N 64 33 98 96 33 80 405 254 87 
The average value is calculated from: 0 = no change, 1 = minor change, 2 = major change. 
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Table Q5.1-93 Sources of finance for investment - on ownership  
  \majority ownership 
% distribution  1993 
state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
savings inside company 89 60 93 100 80 81 87 88 91 
extra capital from owners 3 37 7 0 4 0 3 1 9 
government allocation  8 0 0 0 9 9 6 5 0 
loans from banks       0.2 0 0 0 5 10 4 5 0 
domestic private capital 0 3 0 0 2 0 0.4 1 0 
foreign private capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% distribution  1996          
savings inside company 87 76 88 82 84 86 84 86 80 
extra capital from owners 4 16 3 4 3 2 4 2 10 
government allocation  4 0 1 0 3 4 2 2 0 
loans from banks       5 5 7 14 8 6 8 9 8 
domestic private capital 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 
foreign private capital 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 
% distribution  1999           
savings inside company 88 82 90 85 87 83 86 86 86
extra capital from owners 6 6 1 1 3 3 3 1,6 4 
allocation by government 4 0 1 1 1 3 2 1,9 0 
loans from banks       2 10 7 11 7 10 8 9,3 9 
domestic private capital 0 0 0 2 1 0 0,5 0,7 0 
foreign private capital 0,3 2 1 0 1 1 0,5 0,5 1 
 
Table Q.5 show the distribution in percentage of the different sources of finance for 
investments. It is notable how savings inside the company are the sole dominating 
source for all companies for all years. It is surprising that the level is  not falling 
over time. Bank loans are increasing from 4% in 1993 to 8% in 1996, but the 
increase does not continue up to 1999. The falling source is government allocations 
falling from 6% in 1993 to 2% in 1999. The remaining sources are quite small and 
the totals are changing only very little over time. In 1993 bank loans are 
surprisingly a quite important source for employee owned and no majority 
enterprises. Probably this is bad debt left over from the command economy. In 
1996 banks lend to a broader group of companies, with most importance for 
manager ownership. In 1999 it covers 7-11% in all groups except state, which only 
finances 2% of investments through bank loans. Not surprisingly the state owned 
enterprises have all the years the highest allocations from government. Not 
surprisingly, extra capital from the owners plays the strongest role for foreign 
owned enterprises for all years. It is as high as 37% in 1993 but falling to 16% in 
1996 and 6% in 1999. This source explains most of the differences between 
privatized and new enterprises, since foreign are over-represented among the new 
enterprises.  
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Exports to Eastern market have fallen, while exports to the West have increased 
over time. This results in increasing total exports in the first part of the period and 
then stagnation. Compared with Estonia and Latvia exports are lower for the 
Lithuanian enterprises included in the sample.  
 
The general tendency is that foreign owned enterprises are in the high end and state 
and insider owned enterprises in the lower end. However, the distribution on 
ownership groups shall be interpreted carefully because much of the differences are 
related to difference in weight between industries. Employee owned enterprises 
with high representation in hotels and restaurants and trade are not expected to have 
high export ratios. For state owned enterprises the development is partly due to the 
changing composition of enterprises over time. It seems that companies with high 
export ratios have been privatized over the period. 
 
Table Q.7  Export as % of turnover to East- and West - on ownership  
  \majority ownership 
export % of turnover 
state  for-
eign 
do-
mestic
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total privati
zed 
new 
to Eastern Europe 1993  7 3 10 6 6 11 7 8 6
 1996 6 6 9 7 4 9 8 8 8
 1999 5 5 6 5 4 5 5 5 6
To the West 1993 4 15 6 5 1 6 5 5 8
 1996 4 32 11 6 3 9 9 8 17
 1999 3 31 13 8 4 12 11 10 18
Total export 1993 11 19 16 11 7 17 12 13 14
 1996 10 38 21 13 7 18 17 16 26
 1999 8 36 19 13 8 17 16 15 24
N 1993 132 13 47 45 45 54 339 233 46
 1996 73 27 97 89 42 75 403 252 87
 1999 64 34 98 96 33 80 405 254 87
Missing values included as 0 export to Eastern Europe, if the firm has responded on exports to Western 
Europe and the other way round. 
 
The average utilization of the workforce (Table Q.8a) is slightly falling over time 
for all groups, except for manager ownership. The general fall can be explained by 
economic crisis in Lithuania with falling production in 1999 influenced by the 
Russian 1998-crisis. It is a bit surprising that insider owned together with state and 
foreign firms have relatively high utilization rates. But the differences are not so 
significant, and a few outliers with very low utilization rates have high impact on 
the average values. New enterprises are a bit higher than privatized enterprises. 
The average utilization of plant and equipment (Table Q.8b) are also falling over 
time for all groups except the state. Again, the low numbers for 1999 are related to 
the crisis that year. Especially domestic externally owned and no majority 
enterprises have low utilization of plant and equipment, which is caused by quite 
many companies in these groups having very low utilization rates. New enterprises 
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have high utilization rates because they can adjust capacity already from the start. 
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Table Q.8a  Average utilization of workforce - on ownership  
     \majority ownership 
 
state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
noma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
utilization  
of workforce 
1993 
   N 
92  
133 
96  
12 
91  
46 
96  
45 
94  
45 
88  
55 
92  
336 
90  
234 
96  
42 
 1996 
   N 
92 
73 
94  
27 
88  
97 
94 
 89 
92  
42 
86  
75 
91  
403 
89  
255 
93  
87 
 1999 
   N 
91  
64 
94  
34 
84  
98 
98 
 96 
91 
 33 
82 
 80 
87  
405 
85  
254 
90  
87 
1-25% 1999 
% 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(3) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(2) 
4 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
26-50% 1999
% 
2 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
8 
(8) 
4 
(4) 
0 
(0) 
4 
(5) 
18 
(4) 
13 
(5) 
3 
(3) 
51-75% 1999
% 
6 
(9) 
1 
(3) 
14 
(14) 
12 
(12) 
3 
(7) 
20 
(25) 
56 
(14) 
45 
(17) 
6 
(7) 
76-99% 1999
% 
 22 
(34) 
13 
(38) 
44 
(45) 
39 
(41) 
14 
(42) 
28 
(35) 
160 
(40) 
103 
(41) 
34 
(39) 
100% 1999
% 
34 
(53) 
20 
(59) 
30 
(30) 
41 
(43) 
16 
(51) 
26 
(33) 
167 
(41) 
92 
(36) 
44 
(51) 
N 1999
% 
64 
(100) 
34 
(100)
98 
(100)
96 
(100)
33 
(100)
80 
(100)
405 
(100) 
254 
(100) 
87 
(100)
 
Table Q.8b  Average utilization of plant and equipment - on ownership  
     \majority ownership state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
noma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
utilization of plant 
and equipment
1993 
N
76  
133
87  
12
76  
46
87  
45
83  
45
69  
55
79  
336
64  
234
82  
42
 1996 
   N 
77 
73 
82  
27
68  
97
83 
89
81  
42
69  
75
75  
403 
71  
255 
87  
87
 1999 
   N 
77  
64 
83  
34
60  
98
74 
96
79 
33
61 
80
70  
405 
64  
254 
83  
87
0% 1999
%
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
1 
(2)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
1 
(1)
2 
(0,5)
1 
(0,3)
1 
(1)
1-25% 1999
% 
2 
(3) 
0 
(0)
11 
(12)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
6 
(8)
19 
(4,5) 
18 
(7,7) 
1 
(1)
26-50% 1999
% 
7 
(11) 
2 
(6)
33 
(33)
20 
(21)
5 
(15)
24 
(30)
91 
(22) 
76 
(30) 
6 
(7)
51-75% 1999
% 
20 
(31) 
9 
(27)
19 
(20)
26 
(17)
10 
(30)
19 
(24)
103 
(26) 
67 
(26) 
17 
(20)
76-99% 1999
% 
18 
(28) 
12 
(35)
18 
(18)
24 
(25)
4 
(12)
21 
(26)
97 
(24) 
49 
(19) 
30 
(34)
100% 1999
% 
17 
(26) 
11 
(32)
16 
(16)
26 
(27)
14 
(42)
9 
(11)
93 
(23) 
43 
(17) 
32 
(37)
N 1999
%
64 
(100)
34 
(100)
98 
(100)
96 
(100)
33 
(100)
80 
(100)
405 
(100)
254 
(100)
87 
(100)
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Table Q.9.1 Investment in percent of fixed assets (primo) on ownership  
\majority ownership 
 
state  foreign dom. mana- 
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
investment 
/fixed assets 
1996 
   N 
15 
72 
96 
27 
    50 
97 
114 
90 
66 
42 
29 
74 
55 
402 
35 
253 
155 
74 
 1999 
   N 
15 
54 
85 
32 
40 
87 
72 
91 
63 
29 
36 
76 
52 
369 
39 
238 
107 
74 
0% 1999 9 
(17) 
3 
(9) 
7 
(8) 
18 
(20) 
2 
(7) 
7 
(9) 
46 
(12) 
23 
(10) 
5 
(7) 
]0-5]% 1999 15 
(28) 
3 
(9) 
20 
(23) 
3 
(3) 
5 
(17) 
13 
(17) 
59 
(17) 
47 
(19) 
3 
(4) 
]5-20]% 1999 8 
(14) 
3 
(9) 
20 
(23) 
19 
(21) 
3 
(10) 
21 
(28) 
74 
(20) 
64 
(27) 
8 
(11) 
]20- % 1999 22 
(41) 
23 
(73) 
40 
(46) 
51 
(56) 
19 
(65) 
35 
(46) 
190 
(51) 
104 
(44) 
58 
(78) 
N 1999 54 
(100) 
32 
(100)
87 
(100)
91 
(100)
29 
(100)
76 
(100)
369 
(100) 
238 
(100) 
74 
(100)
Missings excluded, 0'es included. Data for fixed assets are from financial data with few numbers for 1993.  
 
Table Q.9.2   Investment per employee - on ownership  
\majority ownership 
Litas 
state  foreign domes-
tic 
mana- 
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
investment 
/employees 
1993 
   N 
0,41 
104 
2,58
7
0,44
 46
1,28
 38
0,12
 44
0,77
 52
0,60 
291 
0,49 
204 
1,84
 32
 1996 
   N 
10,48 
71 
39,44
27
6,05 
97
21,19
 89
5,23
 42
7,77
 74
12,58 
400 
3,91 
253 
38,34
 87
 1999 
   N 
11,49 
63 
27,05 
34
12,16
 98
5,67 
96
14,54
 33
5,41
 79
10,51 
402 
4,87 
254 
25,89
87
Missings excluded, 0' es included.   
 
 
Investments are in general high in relation to fixed assets, but suspiciously low 
measured per employee (this variable will probably not be used in further analysis). 
Note the fall in investment per employee in the crisis year 1999.  New enterprises 
have relatively high investments both measured in relation to fixed assets and per 
employee. They are heavily represented among foreign and manager owned firms. 
This is part of the explanation for the high level of these firms. Note, however, that 
foreign companies have even higher investments than new firms when measured as 
investment per employee. Measured in relation to fixed assets employee owned 
enterprises have quite high investments, while state owned enterprises are very low. 
Part the explanation is, that fixed assets are quite high for state owned enterprises 
and low for employee owned. Measured per employee state owned enterprises are 
higher than employee owned in 1993 and 1996 and around the average for the total 
group. No majority enterprises are in the lower end of the scale.  
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7. Conclusion 
Ownership is divided in majority ownership by state, foreign, domestic external, 
managers, other employees or no majority. The survey also distinguished between 
still state owned or origin as privatized or established directly as new private firms. 
In this respect the definition of de novo-enterprises were not only based on size as 
in most other studies. The World Bank (2002) distinguishes between new and 
privatized by dividing in groups larger or smaller than 50 employees. Our results 
show that by 1999 a considerable number of new enterprises had more than 50 
employees and many privatized enterprises had less than 50 employees. 
 
The research questions concerned the relation between ownership structures and:  
1: the relation between ownership and control;  
2: compensation systems for managers and other employees;  
3: different forms of restructuring. 
 
Is there correspondence between type of ownership and board representation? 
This is a core question concerning the relation between ownership and control. In 
the Lithuanian sample insiders have strong positions in the company boards. This is 
especially the case for managers, who have the majority of seats in all ownership 
types except for majority employee owned. Other employees are not only strongly 
represented in employee owned, but also in state, manager and no majority 
enterprises. Insiders are even stronger represented than in Estonia and Latvia. This 
is the main reason why in only 26% of the cases there is correspondence between 
majority ownership and majority control of the board. For the specific ownership 
types the highest correspondence is found for employee owned, followed by 
manager and foreign owned, while especially domestic and state owned enterprises 
have very low correspondence. 
 
How is the influence on different groups on different areas of decisions? 
The strong management representation in the boards is to a high degree mirrored in 
the perceived influence of the managers on all decision areas except selection of 
managers. In this area the owners have in fact relatively high influence - on the 
same level as managers. This result corresponds with the answers on who appointed 
the managers. The company boards and the shareholders directly have appointed 
around 80% of the managers. The owners also have some say on long term plans, 
but here only foreign owners have similar influence as managers. Since the 
managers have very high influence even without ownership, the position as 
majority owner only increases their influence marginally. Through majority 
ownership employees increase their influence on strategic decisions, but not on 
operational decisions on wage levels and safety and health, areas where they have 
some say without ownership. Even in majority employee owned enterprises the 
employees have less influence than managers. Therefore, the situation with 
employee ownership management control seems to have some support in the 
sample. Banks have very little influence in Lithuanian companies. This is also 
 Error! Unknown switch argument.
 
 
 
connected to the limited role of bank loans for Lithuanian enterprises. The state has 
only some influence in state owned enterprises and here on a much lower level than 
managers. Foreign owners are the strongest external group. 
 
What are the main channels for employee influence? 
Union membership is in general very low and plays only a role for a few state 
owned enterprises. Unions are not represented in new enterprises. They play no role 
for employee influence. However, share-ownership plays an important role in some 
enterprises. It is the main channel for employee influence in half of the employee 
owned enterprises and in a high number of management owned and no-majority 
enterprises. This seems to be related to relatively high employee minority shares in 
these companies.  
 
Is the tenure of managers varying with different owner-groups? 
There is quite small variation in the year the current manager was appointed. In 
state, employee and no majority enterprises around 20% of the managers dates back 
to the 1980’es. In this respect more of the old guard has survived in Lithuania than 
in Estonia and Latvia. Employee and manager owned enterprises have on average 
the longest tenure, followed by foreign and no majority, while state because of 
many new managers in the latest years have the shortest tenure together with 
domestic externally owned enterprises.  
 
How is the relation between concentration of ownership on specific groups of 
owners and on the largest single owner in relation to type of majority ownership? 
The concentration on ownership on the largest single owner is by definition quite 
high in majority state, foreign and also in management owned enterprises, although 
ownership by several managers can bring the individual shares down. On the other 
hand it is per definition low in no majority enterprises and in employee owned 
enterprises with many employee owners. Domestic externally owned enterprises are 
split in a group of 1/3 of the enterprises with quite high concentration of more than 
50% and 2/3 with quite diversified ownership. This division could be an argument 
for splitting this group in two because it can be expected that the governance 
situation and the position of the managers are quite different in the two groups.  The 
concentration by type of ownership can be found as the degree of other groups 
having minority shareholdings. There is on average such minority holdings in all 
groups, from 27% of the ownership in majority employee owned, 25% in the 
management owned, to 7% in the state owned enterprises in the sample. For the 
insiders the situation shows that there is a floating borderline between employee- 
and management owned enterprises. 
 
Is the competitive pressure varying with ownership type? 
State owned end domestically externally owned enterprises have the lowest number 
of competitors, while management owned have the highest. This can influence their 
performance and must be used as control variables for further analysis. 
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2. How do the compensation systems for managers vary with the different types of 
ownership structures?   
Result dependent compensation for managers is very widespread in the Lithuanian 
sample of enterprises – much more than in Estonian and Latvia. There is profit-
related pay in 60% and sales related pay in 27% of the enterprises in 1999. 
Performance related compensation makes out more than half of the pay in around 
60% of the enterprises without much variation between the owner-groups, except 
that state is slightly below the rest. Profit related pay is a bit more frequent in 
management and domestic owned enterprises compared with state, foreign and 
employee owned. 
 
The difference of total pay between top-managers and employees is quite high in 
Lithuania and increasing over the period 1993-99. The difference is higher than in 
Estonia and Latvia, but part of this can be explained by larger size in the Lithuanian 
sample. Foreign companies have the highest salary level both for managers and 
other employees, and they have a higher pay differential than other owner types. 
The high level is similar, but the high differential is unlike the results from Estonia 
and Latvia. Insider owned enterprises have like in Estonia and Latvia a lower wage 
level. Privatized companies have in general lower wages than new firms. 
 
3. Do the degree and type of restructuring vary between the different types of 
ownership? 
In the Lithuanian survey we introduced five indicators of restructuring: change in 
products, production process, markets, suppliers and organizational structure. In 
general there were an increase in the changes over the period with organizational 
change as the most frequent type of restructuring. State owned enterprises had a 
lower degree of change except for organizational restructuring. Employee owned 
were lower on products, production and markets, but higher in finding new 
suppliers. Foreign enterprises had the highest changes in products and production 
process, but were lower in changing suppliers and organization. Privatized had in 
general more changes than new firms except in the area of developing new markets. 
 
Development in exports is used as an indicator for changing markets. Here are 
foreign enterprises in the high end and state and insider owned enterprises in the 
low end, but much of this can be explained by different weights in the distribution 
on industries. A low utilization of labor indicates a low reactive restructuring. On 
this measure, surprisingly, insider and state owned enterprises are in the high end 
together with foreign companies, while domestic and no-majority enterprises are in 
the low end. The investment analysis showed foreign owned enterprises to be 
significantly higher than the rest. Combined with the analysis on sources of finance 
it confirms earlier findings (Jones and Mygind, 2000a) that foreign owned 
enterprises have easier access to capital from their owners, while lack of capital is a 
barrier for insider owned enterprises. However, for all enterprises savings inside the 
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company is by far the most important financial source. Surprisingly bank finance is 
still on a low level in 1999 for all owner types.  
 
Summing up the results the most striking is the strong manager positions in the 
boards and their strong influence in all areas except appointment of managers. 
There seems to be a strong governance problem in many of the ownership types in 
Lithuania. Foreign owners are the strongest counter-players for managers. Other 
employees are also strongly represented in the boards and not only in majority 
employee owned enterprises. However, the perceived influence is relatively low for 
other employees. These results are quite similar to the results from the Estonian and 
Latvian surveys. A possible explanation can be that the employees in the boards are 
high ranking specialists, not defined as management, but still differing from the 
large group of blue collar and lower white collar employees.  
 
A way to discipline managers and align their interests with the owners has in 
Lithuania been a strong weight on profit related pay to managers. 
 
However, it must be stressed that the presented descriptive results are preliminary. 
More reliable results will be found in econometric studies with the necessary 
controls for differences in size, industry, competition etc. Some analyses have been 
done (Jones and Mygind, 1999-2002) and new are under way, but this preliminary 
study gives important inputs both for new control variables and themes to analyze 
further. The analysis shows that it will probably be fruitful to develop the division 
of owner-types, or better: governance types, so that the control dimension is 
included. Part of the no-majority group can be more specified by first defining a 
group with insider majority ownership and then dividing it by using the relative 
weight of manager/employee ownership and/or their representation in the board. 
Such an analysis will cast more light on the relation between ownership, influence, 
board representation and performance. 
 
Also a deeper analysis on the relation between privatized and new companies can 
give important contributions to the current debate about restructuring in transition 
economies. This can be done in combination with a closer integration of the studies 
for all the three Baltic countries. 
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 Appendix 1.              ID.................. 
Questionnaire to be Completed by person interviewing the Top Manager of the firm  
 
Enterprise governance and restructuring. 
This project is for Lithuania done in cooperation with the Department of Statistics, and Copen-
hagen Busineess School. The objective of the project is to analyze the relation between different 
ownership structures and organizational structures and restructuring of the enterprise. For this 
purpose top-managers in 200 enterprises in each of the three Baltic countries have been 
interviewed. We expect to present the results of the analysis in the second half of 2000.The 
collected data will be treated as strictly confidential. The enterprises will be treated as 
anonymous entities and it will not be possible to identify specific enterprises in publications. 
 
Niels Mygind director    Ona Grigiene head of section 
Center for East European Studies                                Lithuanian Department of Statistics 
Copenhagen Business School                                      Gedimino av. 29 
Dalgas Have 15, 2000 F, Denmark                              2746 Vilnius, Lithuania 
phone +45 38 15 30 32,  fax +45 38 15 30 37              phone 62 94 78,   fax 22 35 45     
 
 
 
 
I  Management and Board Structure 
 
Q1 a) Personal data of top-manager: 
Age:______     Male ___ or Female___   Education_____(1=university degree in 
economics/business, 2=engineer, 3=other university degree, 4=no university degree)    
Years of employment after graduation______. Years of employment in the company_____ 
  
b) Who appointed you (top manager) ? _______ 
1 = state ministry or any state administration; 2 =  labor collective 
3 = meeting of shareholders; 4 = meeting of company board; 5 = other                                      
c) When were you  appointed?  Year_______  Month_______ 
 
Q2  a) What happened to the former manager when you got the position?         ________ 
1= got a better position in another firm 
2= got a lower-ranking position in another firm 
3= got a lower-ranking position in your firm 
4= retired 
5= other / do not know 
 
b) Personal data of the former top-manager at the date of leaving the position 
Age :______     Male ___ or Female___;  Education_____(1=university degree in 
economics/business, 2=engineer, 3=other university degree, 4=no university degree)    
Years of employment in the company_____  Years of employment as top-manager _____ 
 
Q3  Composition of Company Board: (a = 0 if not existing)   end:   1999 1996    1993 
a) What is the total number of members of the board?            ____ ____    ____ 
 How many of the board members represents: 
b) the state or local municipalities?     ____ ____    ____ 
c) foreigners or foreign companies?     ____ ____    ____ 
d) domestic private external owners?     ____ ____    ____ 
e) managers?        ____ ____    ____ 
f) other employees?       ____ ____    ____ 
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 II   Compensation System 
 
Q4  a)  How much was the average monthly total pay for  1999  1996   1993      
the topmanager       _____  _____   _____ 
all employees  (full time pay)      _____  _____   _____   
the lowest paid employee (full time pay)    _____  _____   _____ 
 
b)  of which related to the performance of the company  1999  1996   1993      
for the topmanager       ____%  ____%  ____% 
for all employees        ____%  ____%  ____%   
for the lowest paid employee      ____%  ____%  ____% 
 
c)  Was this performance based on: 1= profit; 2= sales; 3= other 1999  1996   1993      
for the topmanager       _____  _____   _____ 
for all employees        _____  _____   _____   
for the lowest paid employee      _____  _____   _____ 
 
III   Inputs and Outputs 
Q5 Specify the percentage for the following sources for financing investment  
                                   1999     1996    1993    
Savings inside the company (profits)     _____   _____   _____ 
Extra capital from the owners  (increase of equity)   _____   _____   _____ 
Allocation by the government      _____   _____   _____ 
Loan from banks           _____  _____   _____ 
Domestic private capital      _____  _____   _____ 
Foreign private capital (not owners)     _____  _____   _____ 
 
Q6  For your main product          1999    1996    1993   
a) how many other domestic firms compete with you?                ____    ____  
b) how many foreign firms compete with you?                       ____    ____  
 
Q7          1999    1996     1993 
What percent of your turnover was exported    ___%   ___%   ___% 
      of which to Eastern Europe (including Former USSR)  ___%   ___%   ___%   
      of which to Western Europe, Japan or USA              ___%   ___%   ___%   
 
Q8 a) Did you use your workforce 100% of the time  or lower 1999    1996     
1993   
Specify average utilization percentage of the workforce:  ___%   ___%   ___%  
b) How high was the capacity utilization of plant and equipment? ___%  ___%   ___%  
 
Q9  How much was spent on investment on fixed assets? 
1999:                         1996:                            1993:                              
 
Q10  Have you made changes in:    1997-9       1994-6  1991-3 
a)   products      ______ ______ ______ 
b)   production processes    ______ ______ ______ 
c)   found new suppliers    ______ ______ ______ 
d)   developed new markets for output  ______ ______ ______ 
c)   organizational structure of the firm  ______ ______ ______ 
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(0 = no changes, 1 = minor changes, 2 = major changes) 
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IV   Labor Management Relations     ultimo 1999    1996    1993 
 
Q11   a)How many workers were members of labor unions?  ____  ____   ____    
          b)To how many different unions did they belong?           ____     ____    ____    
 
Q12  Rank the following structures in terms of their importance for enabling employees to 
exercise influence over company decisions concerning labor: 
[1 = most, ......, 3 = least, 0 = not relevant]      1999   1996   1993 
 trade unions                  ____   ____   ____ 
 employees as shareholders        ____   ____   ____ 
 other structure             ____   ____   ____ 
 
Q13  For the following  issues,  what was the influence of the following groups: 
1 = high influence,  2 = some influence,  3 = low influence,  4 = no influence 
 
a: 1999                                    group 
 
 
managers other  
em- 
ployees 
Domestic 
Private 
External 
Owners 
bank foreign 
private 
external 
owners 
State 
and 
Local 
Muni- 
Cipality 
1. Long term plans/new technology       
2. Selection of managers       
3. Employment reduction/increase       
4. Wage levels       
5. Safety and health at workplace       
 
 
b: 1996                                   group 
 
 
managers other  
em- 
ployees 
Domestic 
Private 
External 
Owners 
bank foreign 
private 
external 
owners 
State 
and 
Local 
Muni- 
Cipality 
1. Long term plans/new technology       
2. Selection of managers       
3. Employment reduction/increase       
4. Wage levels       
5. Safety and health at workplace       
 
 
c: 1993                                   group 
 
 
managers other  
em- 
ployees 
Domestic 
Private 
External 
Owners 
bank Foreign 
private 
external 
owners 
State 
and 
Local 
Muni- 
Cipality 
1. Long term plans/new technology       
2. Selection of managers       
3. Employment reduction/increase       
4. Wage levels       
5. Safety and health at workplace       
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V  Ownership structure 
 
Q19 
a) ownership of the firm     _______ 
1 = still mainly state owned 
2 = privatized 
3 = established as a new private firm 
  
b) if 2 or 3, when was it privatized/established?       month:______    year: _____ 
      
year of  
priv/start 
Q20       ultimo 1999 1996 1993 Q19b 
What was the percentage of shares owned by:  100% 100% 100% 100% 
a) the state or local municipalities    ____ ____ ____ ____ 
b) foreigners or foreign companies    ____ ____ ____ ____ 
c) domestic private external owners (non-financial)  ____ ____ ____ ____ 
d) domestic private external owners (financial)  ____ ____ ____ ____ 
e) management      ____ ____ ____ ____ 
f) by the other employees     ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
 
Q21       ultimo 1999 1996 1993 Q19b 
How much was owned by the largest single owner % ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
 
Q22       ultimo 1999 1996 1993 Q19b 
a) what was the number of persons employeed?  ____ ____ ____ ____ 
b) of  which management     ____ ____ ____ ____ 
c) of  which other employees     ____ ____ ____ ____ 
  
 
Q23       ultimo 1999 1996 1993 Q19b 
a) What was the number of owners among the employees? ____ ____ ____ ____  
b) among management     ____ ____ ____ ____ 
c) among other employees     ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
 
Q24 
distribution of shares among the employees who are owners  
1 = rather equal,       ultimo 1999 1996 1993 Q19b 
2 = unequal(typical more than 1:2),     ____ ____ ____ ____ 
3 = very unequal (typical more than 1:10) 
 
 
